> ## Documentation Index
> Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://docs.redpill.ai/llms.txt
> Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further.

# Confidential Providers

> The verified upstream providers behind the platform's confidential models, the binding each enforces, and what each attests.

A [confidential model](/confidential-ai/confidential-models) is served by an upstream provider whose
enclave the gateway verifies before forwarding your prompt. Each provider produces one enforceable
[channel binding](/confidential-ai/channel-binding) and a set of
[typed claims](/confidential-ai/tcb-and-claims). This page summarizes what each provider proves.

The receipt's `upstream.verified.provider` field names the provider that served a given request, so a
single model can be backed by any of these providers. The platform adds confidential providers
over time, so treat the `provider` field on the receipt as the authoritative record of who served a
request rather than this list.

## Providers and bindings

| Provider | TEE                              | Channel binding          | Zero data retention |
| -------- | -------------------------------- | ------------------------ | ------------------- |
| Tinfoil  | AMD SEV-SNP (or TDX) + NVIDIA CC | `tls_spki_sha256`        | Yes                 |
| NEAR AI  | Intel TDX + NVIDIA CC            | `tls_spki_sha256`        | Yes                 |
| Chutes   | Intel TDX + NVIDIA CC            | `e2ee_public_key_sha256` | Yes                 |
| Phala    | Intel TDX + NVIDIA CC            | `tls_spki_sha256`        | Yes                 |

* A `tls_spki_sha256` binding pins the upstream HTTPS connection to the verified TLS key.
* An `e2ee_public_key_sha256` binding encrypts the request body to the verified enclave key, so only
  that enclave can decrypt it.
* Zero data retention means the provider does not keep prompt or completion content after serving a
  request. It rests on the provider's contract or published policy, not on the attestation report.
  Third-party routed providers such as `openai` and `anthropic` are not in this set. To enforce the
  property per request, send `provider: {"zdr": true}`. See
  [Zero data retention](/guides/zero-data-retention).

## What each provider attests

Claims are honest about their source. A claim is asserted only when that provider's verifier backs
it; anything not established is `Unknown`. See
[Reading TCB and claims](/confidential-ai/tcb-and-claims) for the vocabulary.

| Claim                         | Tinfoil                     | NEAR AI         | Chutes           | Phala            |
| ----------------------------- | --------------------------- | --------------- | ---------------- | ---------------- |
| `tee_attested`                | Hardware-proven             | Hardware-proven | Hardware-proven  | Hardware-proven  |
| `tcb_up_to_date`              | Tri-state                   | Tri-state       | Tri-state        | Tri-state        |
| `serving_software_known_good` | Verifier-derived (Sigstore) | Unknown         | Unknown          | Unknown          |
| `gpu_attested`                | Unknown                     | Unknown         | Verifier-derived | Verifier-derived |
| `model_weights_provenance`    | Unknown                     | Unknown         | Unknown          | Unknown          |

Notes:

* **`tee_attested` is hardware-proven** for every confidential provider: a genuine TEE quote is
  verified and the request channel is bound to it.
* **`tcb_up_to_date` is a tri-state**, read from the verifier's reported TCB status. An up-to-date
  platform asserts the claim; a stale platform refutes it (the gateway records the stale status
  rather than silently passing); an absent status is `Unknown`.
* **`serving_software_known_good`** is asserted for Tinfoil by comparing its launch measurement
  against published Sigstore golden values for the build. Other providers leave it `Unknown` today.
* **`gpu_attested`** asserts when the provider's NVIDIA confidential-computing GPU attestation is
  verified and nonce-bound. It attests a genuine confidential GPU, not its binding to the serving CPU
  TEE, so it is verifier-derived and never gates a session.

## Router-backed providers

Some providers (NEAR AI, Tinfoil) front many models behind one TEE gateway. The gateway verifies that
gateway channel, so it produces one [attested session](/confidential-ai/attested-sessions) per
router, and the served model is recorded on the receipt. Per-model coverage is delegated to the
verified router, which attests its own backend model enclaves.

## Generic routed providers

A routed response goes to a third-party provider with no confidential-inference verifier (for example
OpenAI or Anthropic). The receipt records `upstream.verified.result = failed` and `required = false`.
The request is served through the TEE gateway, but the upstream is not attested. See
[Trust boundary](/confidential-ai/trust-boundary).

## Next

<CardGroup cols={2}>
  <Card title="Confidential models" icon="microchip" href="/confidential-ai/confidential-models">
    How to confirm a confidential response from its receipt.
  </Card>

  <Card title="Reading TCB and claims" icon="list-check" href="/confidential-ai/tcb-and-claims">
    How to interpret a claim and its source.
  </Card>
</CardGroup>